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Abstract
EU’s Energy security and trade depend, to a large extent, on sea-based transport relying on open 
sea lines of communication and Maritime Security. The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region has supplied 
13 per cent of oil and six per cent of total EU28 consumption. Between 2003 and January 2015, 
piracy in the GoG accounted for 31 per cent of attacks (616 of 1,965) in African waters. With 
that proportion on the rise and a growing threat related to Piracy, illegal over-fishing and crude oil 
theft; maritime (in)security in the region is attracting attention from regional and international 
governments and bodies.
In this context, and considering politicization as a more extreme version or a step to securitization, 
this paper analyses how an issue is brought up to the level of security by a speech act, namely, 
explaining how issues are politicized and securitized within the maritime domain and what strategies 
are involved.
A number of institutions are currently acting to secure the Gulf of Guinea with growing co-operation 
between the region and extra-regional actors. However, the lack of capabilities, weak governance 
within the region and the willingness to take action from extra-regional actors have undermined the 
securitization, and thus, the Gulf of Guinea has remained politicized.
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Introduction: Securitization of Maritime Security
On April 2015, the G7 conference of foreign ministers on Maritime 
Security acknowledged that international security and stability, human 
development, generation of economic growth and prosperity, secure 
energy supply and preservation of ecological diversity depend on a safe, 
sound and secure maritime domain (G7 2015).
As the world’s population grows, our reliance on the good order at sea 
increases, with the proportion of trade by sea growing significantly (Vreÿ 
2011: 59). Keeping open sea lines of communication is vital for humankind, 
permitting transport and trade to enhance further human development 
(Vreÿ 2009: 18).
Good order at sea is maintained through the policed enforcement of 
regulations and laws, such as those emanating from the Convention on 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) stipulations. 
Threats that fall beyond their scope, or that are not being addressed due 
to bad order or to lack of capability from the states, have to be securitized 
(Vreÿ 2011: 59).
The proliferation of incidents of violence at sea off the coast of Western and 
Central Africa between the years of 2006 and 2010 has led this region to 
become a major hotspot of piracy in Africa, alongside the Indian Ocean 
Region. The maritime crime figures for the first quarter of 2016, reported by 
Dryad Maritime, indicate that this region has become the world’s leading 
hotspot, with 31 incidents reported and 37 crew members kidnapped. 
Western and Central Africa is a major concern for international maritime 
trade, with a serious impact on international oil and natural resource 
business, as well as on the interregional economy. Thus, there is a need to 
increase the level of awareness of the threat posed by maritime (in)security.
Between 2006 and 2010, the International Maritime Bureau recorded 29 
attacks in Nigerian waters, leading the region to become the new major 
piracy hotspot in Africa (Otto 2014: 313). Between 2003 and January 2015, 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) recorded the occurrence in 
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the GoG of 31 per cent of piracy attacks (616 of 1,965) accounted in 
African waters.
Reporting on piracy in the Eastern Coast of Africa, the United Nations led a 
process of securitization of piracy, implementing several resolutions (Vreÿ 
2011: 64; Oliveira 2015: 132) and permitting the operation of international 
naval assets within the Somali territorial waters to counter the threats 
posed to open sea lines of communication and human security at sea.
This paper analyses the process of securitization and the path taken, from 
being ignored to the level of being accepted as an existential threat, and 
concludes examining at what level (in the process of securitization) the 
issue of Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea is. The argument, supported 
by the theory of securitization, states that a process of securitization of 
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea was started and is on the move, 
however, has not reached the securitization level and the desired effect, 
thus, not permitting the audience acceptance of the implementation of 
emergency measures or the breaking of rules.
The paper is structured in four sections. The first examines the concepts 
of security and securitization and explains what securitization moves 
are made from politicization to securitization. The second section briefly 
introduces the concept of Maritime Security and how it can be related 
to the concept of security. In the third section, the process of securitizing 
an issue in the maritime domain is analyzed, revisiting the process that 
occurred in Somalia with the securitization of piracy. Finally, in the last 
section, the region of the Gulf of Guinea is characterized, the threats within 
the maritime domain identified and the securitization process compared 
to the one that occurred in Somalia.
Security, Securitization and Securitization Moves
In order to understand the concept of Maritime Security and if there is 
a process of securitization of this issue, it is necessary to introduce some 
concepts, such as security and securitization.
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During the period of the Cold War, the concept of security was 
neglected (Baldwin 1997: 8). In 1983, Barry Buzan reinitiated the debate, 
acknowledging that the extensive use of the term “security” remained 
underdeveloped (Buzan 1983: 3), ambiguous and contested (Buzan 1983: 
6; Booth 2007: 99).
In the tradition of realism, the concept of security, consecrated in the 
legacy of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz, assumes the state as 
the referent object. The state is responsible for the security of is citizens, 
assuming the National Security (defence of sovereignty, integrity, values 
and state interests) as the principal level of security, converting national 
interest in National Security, as in the case of the US National Security Act, 
published in 1947 (Williams 2008: 7).
With the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, it seemed that a 
change in the paradigm was coming, with the security focus moving to 
the individual, as it can be perceived from the wording of the article 55 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, which states the necessary conditions 
for stability necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
as being based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples that can be attainable with the promotion of 
measures centred on the individual, such as the higher standards of living, 
full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development, universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations 1945).
However, this new approach, claimed by a liberalist line, did not refocus 
the object of security; instead, it introduced the concept of collective 
security, in which a group of states that share common values and ideals 
organizes itself to face a common military threat, thus maintaining the 
state as the referent object.
To understand the concept of security, it is important to revisit the 
conceptual analysis made by Wolfers in his article published in 1952, 
probably one of the first to analyse this concept in depth. In his words, 
security can be defined as a value “of which a nation can have more or 
less and which it can aspire to have in greater or less measure” (Wolfers 
1952: 484), therefore, it can be achieved in the absence of threats, allowing 
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establishment of the necessary conditions to acquire other values, such 
as material resources or the control of the actions of others.
Baldwin considered that Wolfers’ characterization of security as “the 
absence of threats to acquired values” brought some ambiguity in the 
phrase “absence of threats” and reformulated it as “a low probability of 
damage to acquired values”, focusing on the preservation of acquired 
values and not on the presence or absence of “threats”, allowing 
expansion of the threats beyond the military, permitting the inclusion of 
events such as natural disasters. With this reformulation, security can be 
defined in two specifications: “Security for whom? And security for which 
values?” (Baldwin 1997: 13).
In the Cold War period, security paradigm remained centred around 
the state: it was the actor, detained the power, settled the interests and 
signed treaties. The end of the Cold War brought back the debate and 
recast the security agenda, taking the focus out of the military threat and 
widening the concept to other sectors and levels of analysis. Walt’s article 
“The Renaissance of Security Studies” acknowledged the applicability of 
security studies to different levels of analysis, considering that they explore 
the way the use of force can affect individuals, states and societies (1991: 
212), however, the focus remained on the military threat, as he stated: “the 
main focus of security studies is (…) the phenomenon of war”. Kolodziej 
(1992: 421) criticized Walt’s perspective, considering that it is restrictive and 
remains focused on the state and on the military dimension of security. He 
affirms that security studies cannot be confined to the analysis of the use of 
force and violence, that it must be inclusive, widening the concept in order 
to integrate the study of non-violent human behaviours.
In 1983, Barry Buzan, picking up Walt’s idea of a three-level analysis, 
proposed considering the concept of security as relational, 
interdependent and with connections between the three levels of 
analysis – the individual, the state and the international system (Buzan 
1983: 13), widening the sectors or dimensions of security beyond the 
military (military, political, economic, social and environmental).
The political debates in the 90s, focused on the content and priorities 
of security and defence policies, identified the main issue in the field 
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of security studies as the analysis of the political process that builds 
the perception of threat and what the issues emerging in the security 
agenda are. From this discussion, a new concept emerged: securitization. 
Originally proposed by Buzan, Weaver and de Wildea (1998), this concept 
states that a securitizing actor, by means of speech act, can induce to an 
audience the perception of priority and urgency of an existential threat, 
meaning that an argument with particular rhetoric can achieve sufficient 
effects to make an audience voluntarily accept and legitimize the actor’s 
breaking of the rules that otherwise would have to be obeyed (Buzan, 
Weaver and de Wilde 1998: 25). 
An actor that presents an argument of an object as an existential threat 
to an audience is making a securitization move, which does not by itself 
create securitization. When the argument reaches sufficient effect, 
legitimizing emergency measures or breaking of rules, made possible only 
by the audience’s acceptance of the existential threat, then the object 
is securitized (ibid: 25).
When an actor uses rhetoric to present an argument and declares to an 
audience that an object of security is existentially threatened (Vreÿ 2011: 56), 
depending upon circumstances and acceptance, the issue can be located 
or end up on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, 
to securitized (see Figure 1) (Ibid: 23).
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Considering the threats and number of actors involved, Maritime Security 
meaning will vary across actors, time and space (Bueger 2015: 163).  Thus, 
macrosecuritization must be considered when analysing the moves of 
securitization of Maritime Security. Macrosecuritization process is defined 
by the same rules that apply to other securitization processes (Buzan and 
Weaver 2009: 257). The key difference is that they are on a larger scale 
and seek to package together securitizations, integrating multiple actors, 
audiences and objects of reference within a “higher” and larger order 
(Oliveira 2015: 132).
Maritime Security
Between 1960 and 1983, there were 111 listed events against maritime 
targets related to terrorism, piracy and other criminal acts (Jenkins et al. 
1983: 6). However, it was in the sequence of the high jacking of the Italian 
cruise ship Achille Lauro in October of 1985 that the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) adopted a series of resolutions, with the objective 
to prevent illicit acts against the passengers and crews of ships1 and to 
ensure the security of the maritime navigation.2 3
Till (2009: 3) highlighted the maritime dimension of globalization, recognizing 
that it depends absolutely on the free flow of sea-based shipping.  He 
also recognized the need to secure a sea-based globalization potentially 
vulnerable to disruption. Acknowledging the benefits and threats to 
maritime navigation early in the 21st century, the maritime issues became 
a greater security focus (Vreÿ 2011: 58). In this context, the absence of 
Maritime Security can pose an existential threat to globalization.
Is Maritime Security an international security issue? Security is about 
survival, and when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to 
a designated referent object, and the nature of the threat justifies the use 
1 Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships (MSC/Circ. 443).
2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).
3 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
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of extraordinary measures to handle them, opening the way for the state 
to mobilize or to take special powers to handle existential threats (Buzan, 
Weaver and de Wilde 1998: 21), we are dealing with an international 
security issue.
The concept of Maritime Security can be characterized as embracing 
and diffuse. In fact, to maintain the security of the maritime domain 
has become a task that gathers several international entities from the 
public and private sector with a common goal to achieve order at sea, 
maintaining the free circulation of persons and goods (Feldt, Roell and 
Thiele 2013: 2).
The analysis of the requirements to achieve “good order at sea”, made 
by Till (2009: 287), pinned down five attributes: good order from the shore, 
the sea as a resource, the sea as a medium of transportation, the sea as 
an area of dominion and the sea as an environment. He also correlated 
the corresponding threats of disorder to the third attribute: the sea as a 
medium of transportation. Considering this, identifying the threats and 
vulnerabilities to the good order at sea has become vital to maintaining 
freedom of navigation. Although the piracy hype, currently the most visible 
of the threats to good order at sea, is hardly a credible collective term for 
such threats and tends to obscure the emergent insecurity in the maritime 
domain (Vreÿ 2009: 19). Where the state is unable or failing to maintain 
good order at sea, the list of crimes that have a maritime dimension 
increases and includes maritime terrorism, trafficking of narcotics, people 
and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, dumping and other 
environmental crimes, with the effects of these crimes felt by coastal 
communities, seafarers and the maritime industry at large.
Scholars and organizations have tried to find a suitable definition of 
Maritime Security. The international organizations mainly followed Wolfers 
approach to security, using the argument that Maritime Security should be 
defined as the absence of these threats. Although there is no consensus 
on the threats identified, they refer to threats such as maritime inter-state 
disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and 
illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes or 
maritime accidents and disasters (Bueger 2015: 159).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXII (75) - 2016
77
Correlating Till’s attributes of good order at sea with the threats to maritime 
security and Buzan’s dimensions of security, we can obtain the dimensions 
of maritime security (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 – Dimensions of Maritime Security
Source: adapted from Till (2009: 287)
Securitization of Maritime Security
According to Bueger (2015: 164), it is possible to frame Maritime Security 
in the concept of securitization. One way it could be done is through an 
analysis of how some issues in the Maritime Security agenda have been 
securitized, determining what issues have been securitized, to what target 
audience and what the referent objects are. Thus, the question of what 
the reference objects are that should be protected from the threats to 
maritime safety can reveal the political interests at stake.
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Vreÿ (2011: 64) argues that the events off the Horn of Africa demonstrate 
a process of securitization within the United Nations (UN) to confront a 
growing security threat at sea. His argument is supported by the fact 
that through the promulgation of several resolutions, the UN presented 
piracy as an existential threat to the flow of food by sea to the displaced 
Somali society, legitimizing the mobilization of international naval forces to 
handle the threat and promote good order at sea.
Oliveira goes deeper in identifying the process of securitization of piracy 
in Somalia, arguing that a process of macrosecuritization has ocurred, 
integrating multiple actors and objects of reference, targeting multiple 
audiences at different levels of analysis, with the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) as the “higher-level” audience (Oliveira 2015: 122). The 
UNSC accepted piracy as a threat to good order at sea and a physical 
threat to environment, human life and propriety (Oliveira 2015: 131). The 
effect of the acceptance led to the promulgation of a resolution (UNSC 
2008), allowing naval assets to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and 
use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. The state’s acceptance of the threat legitimized the mobilization of 
naval assets, taking on the special powers given by the UNSC resolution, 
to handle the existential threats posed by piracy.
Securitizing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
The region of the GoG is fast emerging as an important region because 
of its abundant reserves of mineral and marine resources, combined 
with the potential market offered by its large population (Vreÿ 2009: 23). 
Presently, nearly 70 per cent of Africa’s oil production is concentrated in 
the region. Prospectives indicate that by 2020, oil production of the Gulf 
of Guinea is expected to surpass the total production of the Persian Gulf 
nations and reach 25 per cent of the world global oil production (Rinkel 
2015: 4-5). Currently, the European Union (EU28) meets 13 per cent of its oil 
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Keeping shipping lanes open and safe is vital for transportation and trade, 
permitting the exchange of information and goods to further human 
development (Vreÿ 2009: 18). With the exception of Nigeria, few if any of the 
littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea have the means to enforce governance 
over their maritime sovereignty (Vreÿ 2009: 25). Hence, the lack of capacity 
(including resources and training) to protect themselves (UNODC 2013: 
53) makes the region extremely vulnerable to illicit commercial fishing, 
overfishing and unseaworthy navigation (Rinkel 2015: 4-5), traffickers and 
violent actions at sea, such as armed robbery and piracy.
With the growing importance of this region, world economy and energy 
security will depend on good order at sea and Maritime Security in the Gulf 
of Guinea. Walker (2013: 85) acknowledges that there is an international 
focus on improving security in the region.
The success of international intervention in the Gulf of Aden was followed 
by the decline of incidents of armed robbery at sea and piracy, now on 
the rise in the Gulf of Guinea (Barrios 2013: 92). Between 2006 and 2010, 
the International Maritime Bureau recorded 29 attacks in Nigerian waters, 
leading the region to become the new major piracy hotspot in Africa 
(Otto 2014: 313). International Maritime Organization (IMO) recorded, 
between 2003 and January 2015, the occurrence in the GoG of 31 per 
cent of piracy attacks (616 of 1,965) accounted in African waters, with 
the incidents on International Waters (IW) on the rise since 2008 and even 
surpassing those on Territorial Waters (TTW) in 2011 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 – Maritime Incidents in Western and Central Africa (2008-2015)
Source: Dataset, IMO GISIS (2016)
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Much has been said about the territorial nature of Nigerian piracy, 
with manifestations on Nigerian waters and offshore and the waters of 
neighbouring countries (Otto 2014: 314). Under reporting may impact on 
the characterization of violent acts at sea; piracy is only the visible part of 
many other different criminal activities (Rinkel 2015: 4-5). However, numbers 
held by IMO indicate that piracy is on the rise (Leymarie et al. 2013: 34), with 
the increase of attacks in the high seas while attacks in territorial waters 
and ports are on the decrease. Since 2011, numbers of attacks in the high 
seas surpassed those attacks in territorial waters and ports.
Concerning the issue of Maritime Security, the moves made towards 
securitization in the Gulf of Guinea follow the path of those made in 
Somalia, despite the distinct geopolitical character of that region. oseThe 
process follows a macrosecuritization process with several actors, ranging 
from the shipping industry and states and ending in the United Nations 
Security Council as the “higher-level” audience.
The importance of the region is acknowledge by the international 
community, and there is a perception of the threat posed by the lack 
of Maritime Security, leading to the promulgation of a resolution (UNSC, 
2011) accepting the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in 
the Gulf of Guinea pose to international navigation, security and the 
economic development of states in the region. As in the case of Somalia 
(Oliveira 2015: 131), the threats identified could be good order at sea and 
a physical threat to environment, human life and propriety.
Moreover, this macrosecuritization process led to a series of strategies 
and plans to tackle the threats, such as the Africa’s Integrated Maritime 
Strategy 2050, the Yaoundé code of conduct, the European Union (EU) 
strategy on the Gulf of Guinea and the EU Critical Maritime Routes 2014 
(with a Gulf of Guinea Programme) (Otto 2014: 324), among many others. 
Mainly, the initiatives and operations off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea 
and West Africa have focused on deterring attacks and reducing threats 




o. 66 - 2012
XXII (75) - 2016
81
Conclusion
In sum, in this paper we have examined an argument that suggests that 
a process of securitization of Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea is on 
the move. First, the concepts of security and securitization were revisited 
to support the conceptualization of Maritime Security and the analysis of 
the securitization of this concept. We have demonstrated that there are 
different approaches to the concept of security and that it can be defined 
as “the absence of threats to acquired values” or “a low probability of 
damage to acquired values” and can be analyzed at different levels – 
individual, state and international system – and in different dimensions 
– military, economic, political, environmental and social. Further, we’ve 
analyzed the process of securitization proposed by Buzan, Weaver and 
de Wilde and described the securitization process, recognizing that an 
issue brought up by an actor can lead to an existential threat perceived 
by an audience, but if there are no emergency measures or breaking of 
rules, it won’t be securitized, remaining non-politicized or politicized. 
The analysis of the concept of Maritime Security indicates that there is 
no consensus on finding a concept, however, it is mainly defined as the 
absence of threats in the maritime domain. Moving on to the process of 
securitizing an issue in the maritime domain, we’ve supported our analysis 
on the studies made on the securitization of piracy in Somalia, finding that 
the process was a macrosecuritization, targeting the UNSC as the “higher-
level” audience and reaching the desired effect with the promulgation 
of a resolution permitting international naval assets to tackle the threats 
within the territorial waters of Somalia.
Our analysis indicates that, due to its resources, the region of the Gulf of 
Guinea will increase in importance in the future and that it’s dependency 
on sea-based transport, relying on open sea lines of communication and 
Maritime Security, will focus the international community on maintaining 
good order at sea in that region. Hence, the lack of capability to tackle 
the posed threats will require action from the international community.
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In this context, a number of institutions are currently acting to secure the 
Gulf of Guinea, thus, a process of securitization of Maritime Security could 
be on the move. The production of resolutions, strategies and plans to 
deal with the threats focused on integration and naval capacity building 
indicates that the issue is part of public policy, and government decisions 
have been made and resources allocated, however, no emergency 
measures or breaking of established rules has occurred, thus, we can 
conclude that the issue remains politicized.
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